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MARKET TIMING AND THE CATTLE CYCLE:

A CLARIFICATION
David Aadland and DeeVon Bailey

ABSTRACT

This note addresses the issue of countercyclical strategies in the beef-cattle industry. It
also attempts to clarify and comment on several issues raised by Hamilton and Kastens (2000)
in their article entitled "Does Market Timing Contribute to the Cattle Cycle?"

MARKET TIMING AND THE CATTLE CYCLE:
A CLARIFICATION*

1 Introduction
Recent research related to the supply of cattle has greatly furthered our understanding of the
cycle in aggregate cattle numbers. Yet, despite these gains, researchers and cattle producers
continue to debate whether it is possible for producers to profit by using the regular nature
of the cattle cycle to act countercyclically or "time the market." In academic circles, some
research indicates that there are profits to be made from a countercyclical strategy while other
research suggests there are not. For instance, Rosen et al. (1994) build a dynamic, rational
expectations model of the cattle industry where there is no possibility to increase profits by
acting countercyclically. Trapp (1986), on the other hand, indicates the optimal strategy is to
time the market by building up herds on the upside of the cycle and reduce herd sizes on the
downside of the cycle. In non-academic settings, the message sent to producers tends to be one
advocating countercyclical behavior, although it is unclear whether producers are following
their advice. Beale et al. (1983) in a USDA report entitled "Cattle Cycles: How to Profit From
Them," strongly advocate that producers develop management strategies over the cattle cycle
and offer explicit instructions on how to do so. In trade publications, such as the Western

Livestock Journal (WLJ), the message to ranchers is frequently one in support of timing the
market (e.g., the April 3, 2000 Market Advisor column in the WLJ).
This note addresses the issue of countercyclical strategies in the beef-cattle industry and
also attempts to clarify and comment on several issues raised by Stephen Hamilton and
Terry Kastens in their February 2000 article in this journal entitled, "Does Market Timing
Contribute to the Cattle Cycle?" The primary contribution of their paper is to show that
"market timing" is an important determinant of the cattle cycle. In their words, market
timing is defined as the "incentive ... to deviate from the aggregate movement of the cycle
by behaving 'countercyclically'."

This incentive arises because "a competitive producer

views aggregate output to be independent of his or her own output choice." They state
that an implication of market timing is that the representative producer (i.e., one who acts
cyclically by adjusting inventories to follow the aggregate cattle cycle) will perform worse

*The authors are Assistant Professor and Professor in the Department of Economics, Utah
State University. Please send correspondence to David Aadland, Department of Economics,
Utah State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-3530, or email:
aadland@b202.usu.edu.
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than a producer following a constant-inventory strategy if changes in cattle prices are due
to the "market-timing" effect rather than due to cycles caused by exogenous factors . They
then use this implication to test for (and ultimately find evidence in favor of) 111arket-timing
effects by simulating returns for a hypothetical producer using both strategies .
We center our discussion around two questions . First , under what theoretical conditions
will a mar ket-hilling effect exist and how should it be incorporated into a model of the cattle
cycle? And second what can we learn about the likelihood of successful market timing from
a simple analysis of aggregate US cattle data?

With regards to the second question, we

offer evidence regarding the rel ationship (or lack thereof) between the cycles in cattle stocks
and prices and use it to suggest that cattle producers may be acting rationally by not timing
the market .

2

Market Timing and Theory

How should market t iming be incorporated into a t heoretical model of cattle supply? One
thing that is clear is that countercyclical behavior cannot occur unless there is heterogeneity
across producers . If all producers are identical , then they must all be behaving the same
in a symmetric equili briunl, which means by definition they will be acting procyclically.
Put differently, with identical agents and constant returns to scale, a model of cattle supply
can be simplified by considering only a single representative producer , who will respond to
exogenous shocks in a manner which in t urn produces t he cattle cycle . There is no reason
for any individual producer to "time t he market" because they are responding to exactly
the same incentives and have t he same information set as all other producers.
Hanlilton and K astens (2000) introduce the possibility that an atomistic producer may
benefit from choosing a different strategy than the representative producer. In their analysis, it is therefore implicit that countercyclical producers must be different th an the majority
of producers - either t hrough their objectives or constraints.

Then in response to an ex-

ogenous shock in the cattle industry (e.g., change in beef demand or production costs), the
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majori ty of producers will respond in a procyclical fashion (in essence , producing the cattle
cycle), and then taking that as given , other producers may choose to respond to the same
shock by going against the cycle (i .e., behaving countercyclically). While we believe this to
be the gist of HaIllilton and K astens' argument, at t imes, t heir statements and methodology
blur the n1essage.
First, t hey differentiate b etween two influences on t he cattle cycle: "an exogenous shock
effect that shifts the demand function, itself, and a market t iming effect that represents
the... mOVelllent along a particular, dynaIllic ally stable demand function."

In fact , any

movement along a stable demand function would itself be due to some exogenous shock that
caused the aggregate cattle supply function to shift .l

Therefor e, it is a bit misleading to

refer to one influence as an exogenous shock effect and the other as a market timing effect .
To the extent each is possible, they are both effects generated by exogenous sho cks. And
second , the effect of market tillling on the cattle cycle is not clearly characterized. Hamilton
and Kastens test for t he possibility of a market t iming effect and claim to find one, but
do not discuss the quantitative impacts of such an effect on t he cattle cycle. They claim
that their results indicate "that t he market timing effect has an important influence on the
determin ation of the various phases of expansion and contraction in the cattle cycle." While
we suspect t hat countercyclical behavior may be an important influence on the cattle cycle,
their article leaves us wondering exactly how 11larket tillling affects the cattle cycle.

To

describ e exactly how market timing affects the cattle cycle, a complete model of the cattle
cycle with heterogenous producers is necessary, such that S0111e producers would react in
one fashion (e .g. pro cyclically) to t he shock and others respond in another fashion (e .g.,
countercyclically) .

I I n ce rta in types of mode ls, t here is the possib ili ty of en dogenous flu ctuations or sunspots to show up in
the equi librium solution. Th ey are , however , ru led ou t for the class of models considered by H ami lton and
K astens (2 000 ) .
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Market Timing and the Data

In order for a countercyclical production strategy to be feasible, the location of future prices
within the cattle cycle must be at least somewhat predictable.

However, the empirical

evidence regarding the nature and existence of cycles in cattle prices is mixed.
al. (1994) state that" cycles in price and consumption ... are not observed."

Rosen et

Mathews et

al. (1999) state that" cattle prices also fluctu ate during cattle cycles, but have their own
patterns, sOlTIewhat but not perfectly correlated with cattle inventories ." In other writings,
one gets the sense h at t here is a regular price cycle, which is the mirror image of the cattle
stock cycle.

This is seen most clearly in trade and professional publications, and to a

lesser degree , in some academic publications.

For example, Hughes (2000) writes in the

Market Advisor of the WLJ that" the key to developing profitable heifer retention lies in
the U-shaped price cycle . The 10-year cattle cycle causes 10-year beef price cycles." Beale
et al. (1983) write that" a conscientious cowboy or rancher can conquer the ... price cycle."
Rucker et al. (1984) state that" after all, the cyclical behavior of cattle prices has prevailed
for a century and with considerable predictability." Mundlak and Huang (1995) write that
"spectral decompositions ... show the existence of cycles having surprising regularity for all
the four time series [including prices]."

In Figure 1, we superimpose a plot of aggregate US calf numbers on the real price of
calves (defl ated by t he consumer price index, 1967 = 100) over the period 1930 - 1997. 2
The stock of calves (represented by the dashed line) in Figure 1 clearly exhibits a regular
cyclical pattern with a period of approxilTIately ten years .

This is the well-known cattle

cycle. Cattle prices (represented by the solid line) also appear to display a cyclical pattern,
although much less regular. It is clear that cattle prices are not the mirror image of cattle
inventories. Although there are periods such as 1954, 1959 and 1979 where peaks (troughs)
in cattle numb ers correspond approximately to troughs (peaks) in cattle prices , there are
other periods such as 1943 , 1973 and 1986 where the opposite is true.

This is, however,

2We focus on the stock and prices for calves to simplify the presentation. An analysis of cows and heifers
provided similar results.

5

exactly what one would expect in a lnarket subject to periodic demand and supply shocks.
Only in the case where demand is dynamically stable and aggregate supply is continually
shifting should would we expect to observe prices cycles that are mirror images of stocks.
In fact, the sin1ple correlation between the calf stock and real calf prices is -0.506 , which
does indicate a significant inverse relationship between the two, although it is as equally
close to zero as to one. 3
What does all this imply abo ut the possibility of a producer adopting a countercyclical
strategy?

VVe suggest that it may indeed be rational for a risk-averse producer to not

attempt to time the market. To be successful in a counterGyclical strategy, producers need
to be able to for ecast with a reasonab le degree of certainty, the future path of prices during
a cattle cycle. This is difficult for a couple of reasons . First, every stock cycle is different .
Although stock cycles are fairly regular with an approximate ten-year period on average,
some cycles are as long as 15 years (e.g., 1980 peak to 1995 peak) and some are as short
as six years (e .g., 1974 peak to 1980 peak).
a nontrivial identification problem .

Second, ranchers are constantly posed with

Supply and demand shocks are continuously hitting

the market and , for a countercyclical strategy to be successful they need to infer whether
cattle prices are going to mirror the stock cycle or not.
Another way of making this point is to examine t he accuracy of out-of-sample price
forecasts based only on current and past information.

Using data frOln 1930 through

1985 , we estinlated an unrestricted bivariate vector autoregression using the (detrended)
stock and real price for calves. 4

Then we calculated out-of-sample forecasts for the calf

stock and calf prices for the period 1986 through 1997 and contrasted them with the actual
series . The act ual and forecasted prices for calves are displayed in Figure 2. Think of a
typical producer in 1985 who is considering a countercyclical strategy. Based on the given
forec asts the producer expects that prices will reach a peak in 1987, begin to decline and
3 Before calculating the simple correlation coefficient, the series were deb'ended using the Hodri ck Prescott
filter. See lVlundlak and Huang (1995) for more details.
4 We recognize that we are only using a small portion of the information available to producers, but do
not think that it is entirely unreasonable to think that when producers forecast future calf prices that they
focus most acutely on th e historical pattern of the calf stock and calf prices.
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reach a low point in 1992 , and then rise again until reaching another peak in 1996. Using
a countercyclical strategy, the producer would elect to sell a higher than average numbers
of heifer calves and/or cows during the period of relatively high expected prices (1986-89),
then begin to retain and / or purchase heifers during the period of relatively low expected
prices (1990-94), and then sell the higher than average number of calves during the ensuing
peak period (1995-97).

Clearly this strategy would not bring about the returns expected

- the producer would be purchasing and/or foregoing the sale of females during a period

(1990-94) when prices were at or near the peak of a price cycle and would be selling a larger
than average number of calves during a period (1995-97) when prices were at an historical
low.
In this note , we are not advocating any particular managen1ent strategy for producers
over the cattle cycle. Rather , we are silTIply pointing out that cattle prices do not follow a
regular cycle that mirrors the regular cycle in cattle stocks. This is due to the concurrence
of supply and den1and shocks over time in the cattle market. As a result, producers who do
not adopt countercyclical management strategies may not be acting irrationally. However,
at the same time , there is a weak cycle in cattle prices and some producers may attempt to
for ecast future prices and time the n1arket. To capture and quantify market-timing effects
on cattle dynamics within a theoretical model of cattle supply (such as that in Rosen et al.,

1994) will require t he introduction of rancher heterogeneity. We know of no such published
research but believe that it would be a valuable contribution and would shed some light on
the ongoing debate over countercyclical behavior in the cattle market.
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Figure 1. Calf Stock vs. Real Calf Prices
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Figure 2. Actual vs. Forecasted Real Calf Prices
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Introduction

Recent research related to the supply of cattle has greatly furthered our understanding of the
cycle in aggregate cattle nurnbers. Yet, despite these gains, researchers and cattle producers
continue to debate whether it is possible for producers to profit by using the regular nature
of the cattle cycle to act countercyclically or "tillle the market ."

In academic circles,

some research indicates that there are profits to be made from a countercyclical strategy
while other research suggests there are not.

For instance, Rosen et al. (1994) build a

dynamic, rational expectations model of the cattle industry where there is no possibility to
increase profits by acting countercyclically. Trapp (1986), on the other hand , indicates the
optimal strategy is to time the market by building up herds on the upside of the cycle and
reduce herd sizes on the downside of the cycle. In non- academic settings, the message sent
to producers tends to be one advocating countercyclical behavior, although it is unclear
whether producers are following their advice .
entitled " Cattle Cycles:

Beale et al.

(1983) in a USDA report

How to Profit From Them ," strongly advocate that producers

develop m an agement strategies over the cattle cycle and offer explicit instructions on how
to do so. In trade publications, such as the W estern Livestock Journal (WLJ), the message
to ran chers is frequently one in support of timing t he 11larket (e.g., the April 3, 2000 Market
Advisor column in the WLJ ).
This note addresses the issue of countercyclical strategies in the beef-cattle industry
and also attempts to clarify and comment on several issues raised by Stephen Hamilton and
Terry Kastens in their February, 2000 article in this journal entitled "Does Market Timing
Contribute to the Cattle Cycle?" The primary contribution of their paper is to show that
"market timing" is an important determinant of the cattle cycle . In their words, market
timing is defined as the" incentive ... to devi ate from the aggregate n10vement of the cycle
by b ehaving" countercyclically" ."

This incentive arises because " a competitive producer

views aggregate output to be independent of his or her own output choice."

They state

that an implication of market timing is that the representative producer (i.e., one who acts
cyclically by adjusting inventories to follow the aggregate cattle cycle) will perform worse
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